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Some Effects of Extending the Navigation
Season on the Great Lakes: A Need for
Congressional Action
L OCATED IN THE ST. MARY'S RIVER, which links Lakes Superior
and Huron, is a group of inhabited islands whose residents could
conceivably be cut off from the rest of the world during the winter
months. For generations, residents have travelled back and forth
between their island homes and the mainland to work, shop, obtain
fuel, attend school and religious services, and receive medical treat-
ment. When conditions permitted, the trips were made by private
boat or public ferry vessel over the two hundred to one thousand
yards which separate the various islands from the mainland. Be-
tween mid-December and April of each year, however, the water
separating the two shores is frozen, and the islanders must transit
over or through an "ice highway" to the mainland in order to carry
on their daily activities. Over the years this has been accomplished
either by walking over naturally-formed ice bridges or by using the
public ferry which continues to operate in an open-water track be-
tween those ice bridges.'
Recently a situation has developed which threatens to strand
these people on their islands. This result stems from the premature
and unnatural breakup of the surrounding ice cover used by the
islanders to transit to and from the mainland. The cause of this pre-
mature ice breakup is a pilot program undertaken by the United
States Army Corps of Engineers in conjunction with the United
States Coast Guard and other federal agencies, pursuant to an act
of Congress, authorizing an extension of the navigation season on
the Great Lakes. 2
The ultimate result of this ongoing pilot program has been the
loss by the islanders of their natural right to move over natural
things. This situation typifies similar problems facing many property
owners along potentially frozen waterways, and illustrates the gen-
eral problem facing the entire Great Lakes region with the advent
of a permanently extended winter shipping season.
The thrust of this note is to probe that "natural right" as
affected by the extended navigation season proposal. The basic con-
flict is one of competing rights and interests. On the one hand is a
1JOINT UNITED STATES COAST GUARD - CANADIAN COAST GUARD Gums TO GREAT
LAKES IcE NAVIGATION 16 (Spring 1973) (Copy on file at United States Coast Guard
Ice Navigation Center, Fed. Bldg., Cleveland, Ohio) [hereinafter cited as JOINT GUIDE).
2 River and Harbor Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-611, § 107, 84 Stat. 1818, amending 33
U.S.C. § 426 (1970).
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group of private citizens claiming a private right in the traditional
use of the ice in its natural condition. On the other hand are those
arguing in favor of the economic desirability of opening a vast, com-
mercially rich region to year-round waterborne accessibility. In other
words, there is a clash between conflicting private regional interests,
and public national interests. It is the author's contention that since
Congress gave birth to the problem by legislating federal resource
involvement into an otherwise private commercial realm, any rem-
edies which exist as a result of adverse effects on private rights
must likewise originate with Congress and may not properly be
sought through the courts. Of particular importance to such a con-
clusion, and the liabilities of the various parties involved, is a full
appreciation of the source of the problem, an understanding of the
development of the private right to travel on ice, the development
of the public right of navigation, and the role of the federal govern-
ment in breaking ice.
Source of the Problem
For many years the United States has been faced with a prob-
lem regarding the utilization of one of its great national resources,
the Great Lakes region.3 This vast network of rivers, straits, canals,
and lakes affords both the United States and Canada a means of
reaching an immense segment of industrial and agricultural re-
sources which would otherwise be accessible only over land or by
air.4 The fact that the industry of this region contributes over thirty-
four percent of the gross national product of the United States and
Canada certainly indicates its importance as a very fruitful eco-
nomic resource. 5 Until recently, however, the majority of the Great
Lakes ports have been icebound, and therefore inaccessible, for as
much as four and one-half months of the year, or nearly thirty-
eight percent of the time.6 It was not until 1965 that active efforts
were initiated on the federal level to study the feasibility of extend-
ing the navigation season on the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence Sea-
3 Volpe, Extension of the Seaway Navigation Season Is Essential to Halt Economic Erosion,
SEAWAY REVIEW (Summer, 1971) (Reprinted in 117 CONG. REC. 40320, 40322 (1971).
4 R. REEBIE AND ASSOCIATES, INC., LAND TRANSPORTATION ECONOMICS FOR GREAT
LAKES TRAFFIC VOLUME (1971). The economic advantages of water transportation
through the Great Lakes system were made available to a vast market consisting of 3647
of the total U. S. population, 42% of the nation's industrial activity, 50% of its
agricultural output, and 50% of its steel production. Bulk commodities alone contribute
the major domestic traffic on the Lakes, with 77% of the nation's iron ore needs, 76%
of its coal needs, and 66% of the nation's limestone needs moving on this Great Lakes
system. Letter from W. R. Ransom, General Manager, Lake Shipping Operation, United
States Steel Corp., to R. T. Keenen, Esq., Ray, Robinson, Keenen and Hanninen, November
13, 1973.
SExtension of Navigation Season on the Great Lakes, 117 CONG. REC. 5069 (1971)
(remarks of Senator Griffin).
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way with a view toward expanding the shipping efforts in that region
to a full-time, year-round basis.' The ultimate goal, of course, was to
gain the maximum benefit of the economic productivity of the area,
which up until then had not been fully tapped.8
In response to these goals, Congress legislated the requirement
for a pilot program to determine the feasibility of extending the
navigation season into the winter months.9 However, just as a
familiar axiom of physics holds that for every action there is an
equal and opposite reaction, apparently the government's positive
action in extending the shipping season has triggered an analogous
negative reaction. As a result, a conflict has developed between a
minority group of islanders who depend on nature for their mobility
and thus their very existence, and the interests of the national
economy as a whole in developing trade potential in the region. Of
special significance are the legal ramifications which pit individual
rights against regional and national economic needs. The position
that the government and the courts have taken and will take on this
issue is thus an important policy question. 10
The primary force behind the pilot program has been Congres-
sional authorization of six and one-half million dollars to enable the
United States Army Corps of Engineers and the United States Coast
Guard to study the various problems affecting an extended season
endeavor. One of the matters in dispute is the problem of ice-
breaking, its various environmental effects, and its potential legal
ramifications."
More specifically, the problem has surfaced in the St. Mary's
River area connecting Lake Superior and Lake Huron, although any
discussion here of that locale must necessarily relate to similar prob-
lems experienced elsewhere in the Great Lakes system.1 2 Tradition-
ally, during the period from mid-December through April, natural
ice bridges form between the several inhabited islands located in the
St. Mary's River between Sault Ste. Marie and Pt. DeTour.13 During
7River and Harbor Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-298, § 304, 79 Stat. 1093.
a The 1965 study was authorized by Congress to investigate and determine the preliminary
engineering and economic feasibility of extending the navigation season. The report of
that first study emphasized the complexity of the project and recommended a second study.
9 River and Harbor Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-611, § 107, 84 Stat. 181; Great Lakes
Shipping Crisis, 117 CONG. REC. 40320 (1971) (remarks of Senator Griffin).
'Year-Around Shipping Season on the Great Lakes, 117 CONG. REC. 14945 (1971)
(remarks of Representative Ruppe).
11 Although the propriety or legality of Coast Guard icebreaking operations has not before
been challenged, the integral part such activities must take in the current project neces-
sitates consideration of those factors at this time; see, Year-Around Shipping Season on
the Great Lakes, supra note 10.
12 JOINT GUIDE, supra note 1.
13 For a nostalgic discussion of the reliance on the natural conditions discussed herein, see
Lowe, The Ice Bridge, The Weekly Wave (Feb. 24, 1971) (Copy on file at United States
Coast Guard Ice Navigation Center, Fed. Bldg., Cleveland, Ohio).
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the winter months, transit to the mainland by the island residents
is accomplished by travel on foot, sled, snowmobile, or other avail-
able devices over the ice, or by means of ferry vessels operating on
routine schedules between the larger islands and the mainland. 14 As
a ferry transits the area between an island and its mainland docks,
an open-water track forms as the water freezes on the upstream and
downstream sides of the passage. The water current through this
track helps prevent the open water from freezing over. Thus, natur-
ally-formed ice bridges (or "booms," as they may sometimes be
called) above the ferry track have been relied on in the past as an
aid in maintaining a clear ferry path. Where no vessel service is
available, the ice has been used as a natural bridge between the
island and the mainland.
With the introduction of an extended navigation season, many
of these traditional ice bridges have been destroyed or dislocated,
with the result that the islanders no longer can depend on natural
conditions for the formation of these bridges. Now, instead, the
bridge formation is being forestalled, disrupted, and often prevented
by the continuation of vessel traffic through these areas long after
the time such traffic otherwise would have been excluded because of
the frozen conditions normally prevailing after mid-December. But
for the government-sponsored feasibility program and assistance
rendered by a small armada of Coast Guard icebreakers, most vessel
traffic through these areas would be curtailed or eliminated as in
the past.15 It is this continuing vessel traffic which dislodges the
forming ice booms and causes the broken brash ice to flow into the
open track area where it becomes jammed and eventually prevents
the ferry vessel's operation. 6 The natural ice bridges formed between
the smaller islands and the mainland also become dislodged, thereby
14 Spring breakup, or even thaw breakups, will not be considered here.
One of the worst floods the Soo [Sault St. Marie, Mich.] area has had came in
1951 prior to the extended season when during a thaw, ice broke loose from
the Soo Harbor and jammed into the Little Rapids Cut area. This naturally
stopped any transit to the island along with flooding the area, and the Neebish
islanders have always had a problem in establishing their ice bridge in the fall
and also with the spring break up. Both of these times of year are hazardous
and certainly this type of archaic transit should not be encouraged.
Letter from W. R. Ransom to R. T. Keenen, supra note 4.
Is 144 NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC, 148-49 (August 1973); JOINT GUIDE, supra note 1, at
End. (1).
16The terms ice boom and ice bridge may be used interchangeably herein. However, ice
bridge more nearly refers to the natural formation of ice cover between an island and
the mainland over which individuals walk, whereas the term ice boom refers to an ice
formation, not necessarily used for walking, upsteam of a ferry vessel track to prevent
small, broken pieces of ice flowing into the track. It is really more a natural blockage
than anything else. The contention has been made that if steps were taken to protect
an ice bridge with artificial booms or by some other means, there would be created in
the absence of a permit from the Army Corps of Engineers an unlawful obstruction to
navigation. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 511-13, 516, 519 (1971).
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effectively stranding the residents on these islands without available
sources of food, fuel, medical aid, and other necessities.
While the problem of premature breakup is not one of national
prominence or general concern at this time, it has aroused the at-
tention of members of the House of Representatives and the Senate,
who have voiced strong concern for the safety and well-being of the
island inhabitants. The problem is sufficiently important to enough
people that it should be resolved before any determination is made
regarding final approval of any extended winter navigation program
assisted by federal resources. 17
Development of the Conflict
The legal issues involve the competing rights of commercial
shipping (aided by federal government resources) to engage in com-
merce, and local inhabitants to rely on the naturally frozen condi-
tions of the surrounding waters. The public (commercial or govern-
mental) interest, although possibly economically justifiable, may be
forced by the private (residential) interest to bear the burden of its
seemingly disruptive consequences.
Private Rights to Use Natural Ice Formations
Traditionally, the right to travel on ice has been recognized as
a public right. 18 This right has been classified with the right to
travel on public highways and navigable waters and is not sus-
pended merely because the area must be traversed by foot rather
than by boat.1 9 The right to travel on the ice, although not a dom-
inant right exclusive of all others, has been held to be superior to
many.2 0
In the past, courts have considered alternative uses of frozen
waterways and the ancillary rights attached thereto. For example,
using the ice as a roadway during the winter months as a substitute
for the traditional ferry vessel crossing during the milder months
was considered a right, and any wanton and unnecessary distur-
bance of that right was held to be improper. 21 The violation of that
right to use the ice for transit constituted a breach of "that great
principle of social duty, by which each one is required so to use his
own rights as not to injure the rights of others. '2 2 Other courts have
17 Year-Around Shipping Season on the Great Lakes, supra note 10.
1845 C.J. Navigable Waters § 135 (1928); 65 C.J.S. Navigable Waters § 59 (1966);
Board of Park Comm'rs v. Diamond Ice Co., 130 Iowa 603, 105 N.W. 203 (1905),
19Board of Park Comm'rs v. Diamond Ice Co., 130 Iowa 603, 105 N.W. 203 (1905).
20 French v. Camp, 18 Me. 433, 36 Am. Dec. 728 (1841).
21 Id. at 434-35, 36 Am. Dec. at 729.
22 1d. at 435, 36 Am. Dec. at 729.
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likewise dealt with the right of an individual to rely on the water-
way in its frozen state for passage, 23 and have even gone so far as
to impose criminal sanctions for the unlawful interference and dis-
turbance of the right of public passage across ice in a river that had
been used for many years for that purpose.24
In another area, the courts have discussed the business of ice
harvesting as that activity affects use of the ice by others.2 5 It has
been held that the right to gather ice might in fact take precedence
over the right to travel on the ice, depending on a balancing of the
interests to be served and the relation of those interests to the com-
munity at large.2 6 Also, where ice was used for recreation, another
court found that a duty was owed to the public in the exercise of the
individual's right of reasonable use of the ice to refrain from mak-
ing an otherwise safe passage unsafe.2 7
Since the specific requirements of these conflicting rights do
not permit simultaneous use and enjoyment of the same ice for
their different purposes, the usage offering the greater benefit to the
public should logically be favored. That does not mean, however, that
one usage should be preferred to the total exclusion or elimination of all
others.2 8 Rather, since not all rights are equal, their relative impor-
tance must be determined in light of the particular circumstances of
each case.2 9
Irrespective of the question of balancing of rights, it is ap-
parent that the public has a right to use frozen waters for travel,
particularly where a traditional route has been established by con-
tinuous and frequent resort. Furthermore, the courts seem to im-
plicitly hold that the longer the exercise of the right and acceptance
of it by the public at large, the more significant the right will be-
come relative to other rights which may tend to compete with it.
Consequently, the traditional use in the Great Lakes region of natur-
ally formed ice bridges as a mode of transportation for generations
23 Maine v. Wilson, 42 Me. 9, 21 (1856), noted two conflicting interests, a public highway
across a navigable stream and "an existing highway, the river itself, in which all the
citizens have an interest." Thus, the potential conflict between the two modes of utilizing
the same waterway for travel began to develop. See also Munninghoff v. Wisconsin
Conservation Comm'n, 255 Wis. 252, 38 N.W.2d 712, 716 (1949).
24Commonwealth v. Christie, 13 Pa. County Ct. 149 (1893).
2 5Woodman v. Pitman, 79 Me. 456, 10 A. 321 (1887). Concededly, such concern has
lost much of its relevance with today's reliance on modern refrigeration methods.
26 Woodman v. Pitman, 79 Me. 456, 10 A. 321 (1887).
2 Parsons v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours Powder Co., 198 Mich. 409, 414, 164 N.W. 413,
415 (1917); accord, Gay v. Webster, 277 Mich. 255, 269 N.W. 164 (1936) and
Sowles v. Moore, 65 Vt. 322, 26 A. 629 (1893).
28 Woodman v. Pitman, 79 Me. 456, 461, 10 A. 321, 327-28 (1887).
29Id. at 459, 10 A. at 324; accord, Whitcher v. State, 87 N.H. 405, 181 A. 549 (1935).
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must be considered as a substantial right. However, if a greater
number of people are affected by the exercise of a different and
competing right, even though it is a more recent development, would
a court rule in favor of the right operating for the longer period
of time? It would seem that some conflicting public endeavor of a
more significant nature surely would be needed to overcome the
presumption of superiority of a right which appears to have been
established with respect to the right to travel on ice. Such may be
the case when the paramount right of navigation is considered.
The Public Right of Navigation
That such a public endeavor should be encompassed within the
commerce clause of the Constitution should come as no surprise,
since it is on the basis of this one section of the Constitution that
much of the national economic policy has been sustained.30
The congressional power to regulate commerce among the sev-
eral states and with foreign nations by regulating navigation was
judicially treated as early as 1824.31 Since then, in the area of federal
control over navigable waters, a steady progression of cases has
supported and gradually extended this basic premise of congressional
authority.32
The congressional power over commerce insures that navigation
on all of the navigable waters of the United States is protected and
advanced in as safe and convenient a manner as possible.33 As to
3 U. S. CONST. art. I, § 8,: "The Congress shall have the power to regulate commerce with
foreign nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes." "Commerce
includes navigation." Gilman v. Philadelphia, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 713, 724 (1866). For
a survey of the application of the commerce clause of the Constitution by the courts, see
W. LOCKHART, Y. KAMISAR & J. CHOPER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 139441 (3d ed.
1970).
3 1 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
32 Pennsylvania v. The Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 421 (1855)
(holding a bridge built across the Ohio River to be an obstruction to navigation, but
ultimately acceeding to Congressional power to regulate commerce, including the regula-
tion of navigation, because an act of Congress had declared the bridge to be a lawful
structure, not a navigation obstruction); Gilman v. Philadelphia, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.)
713, 714 (1866), citing Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824) (holding that
essentially any navigable river situated in more than one state was under the regulation
of Congress as part of the public property of the nation. This power includes the
responsibility to prevent obstructions of any kind from any source, and to take whatever
steps were necessary and proper under the circumstance to prevent recurrence); The
Clinton Bridge, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 454 (1870) (holding an act of Congress which
declared a particular bridge a lawful structure necessary for a post-route constitutional,
and reaffirming Congress' power to decide what should be considered an illegal obstruc-
tion to navigation); The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 564 (1871) (noting that
Congress is also authorized to regulate the form and size of vessels to be used on
navigable waters, and to inspect and license such vessels to insure that they have been
properly constructed and equipped). In regard to the inspection and licensing of vessels,
see, H. KAPLAN & J. HUNT, THIS Is THE COAST GUARD 153-60 (1972). For an
excellent abbreviated discussion of the right of navigation in another context, see Grund-
man, Swell Damage and the Right of Navigation, 15 CLEVE.-MAR. L. REV. 92, 95 (1966)
and authorities cited therein.
3 3 The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 564 (1871).
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what waters might be covered by such authority, the Supreme Court
has announced simply that "those rivers are public navigable rivers
in the law which are navigable in fact." (emphasis added)
The federal power over navigation has included changes in the
course of navigable streams. A dispute arose between South Carolina
and Georgia when water was diverted from one channel of the
Savannah River by construction of a crib dam in order to raise the
water level of another channel of the river, thus improving the
latter's navigability. 35 In the equity action seeking injunctive relief
on the basis that such improvement to one channel was in fact an
obstruction of certain methods of navigation in the other, the Court
determined that Congress' right to regulate commerce and naviga-
tion embodies the right to make improvements to navigable rivers
in aid of navigation whether or not some structures constructed for
that purpose might actually be obstructions. 36
Soon after the turn of the century, the power of the United
States government to control and regulate navigation in support of
commerce was exercised over waters navigable only by artificial
means even though completely located within the borders of one
state. In an action involving the Erie Canal and the Hudson River,
it was noted that although a distinction in fact might exist between
artificially navigable waters wholly located within one boundary and
naturally navigable waters, nevertheless, there is no distinction in
principle.37 Canals, it was said, cannot be distinguished from other
navigable bodies of water, because they are normally built to con-
nect otherwise naturally navigable bodies of water or to improve an
already partially navigable existing channel between such bodies,
and are generally plied by the same vessels as transit other navigable
waters.38 The Court then proceeded to list several such connecting
links permitting navigation from the western end of the Great Lakes
to the Welland Canal and the St. Lawrence River, including the St.
Mary's Canal. 3' The fact that the waterway in question was located
completely within the state of New York in that case was held to be
immaterial. Since it acted as a key link in the "highway of commerce
between ports in different states and foreign countries," it was con-
sidered as navigable water within the regulatory scope of Congress
34 Id. at 563. Navigable in fact is use or able to be used "in their ordinary condition" as
highways for commerce in "customary modes of trade and travel on water." Id. at 564.
35 South Carolina v. Georgia, 93 U.S. 4 (1876).
36 Id.
37 The Robert W. Parsons, 191 U.S. 17, 26-27 (1903).
38 Id. at 27.
39 Id. In Ainsworth v. Munoskong Hunting & Fishing Club, 159 Mich. 61, 123 N.W. 802
(1909), it was noted that the St. Mary's River is, in fact, navigable water.
[Vol.23:295
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and under the judicial jurisdiction of the admiralty courts of the
United States.40
The "public right of navigation" again came into focus in an-
other case involving the St. Mary's River where the ownership of
private property in water power capacity of certain rapids and falls
located on that river was discussed. 41 That such a property right
could exist under private ownership was rejected by the Court. An
individual could conceivably "own" a private stream which was lo-
cated wholly on land belonging to him, the Court said, but it is
absolutely inconceivable that there could exist any private owner-
ship or property rights in the "running water in a great navigable
stream."42 Any property rights which may exist in the use of the
water, of which one is navigation, therefore, belong in common to
the public. It was stated therein, however, that in addition to those
common public rights, the riparian owners along such navigable
waters also have certain incidental rights of ownership which in-
clude the right to build wharves, piers, docks, or other structures in
shallow water for access to deeper water. Even that right, however,
was held to be subordinate to the public right of navigation, and if
such structures were found to be obstructions to navigation or were
otherwise detrimental to the public's interest therein, the owner was
obliged to suffer the consequences of such determination and was re-
quired to remove the structures. It was held that Congress was the
sole authority for determining what did or did not constitute an
obstruction to navigation. 3
By 1913 the "plenary power of the United States to legislate
for the benefit of navigation" was a foregone conclusion.44 The
Court, therefore, no longer found it difficult to uphold certain public
works projects along such waterways as the Mississippi River by
finding that navigation was aided thereby. Progress and develop-
ment would not be halted merely by an individual's assertion of a
private right to the retention of "primitive conditions" of his land.
4 5
So well recognized was the public right of navigation that the
Court thereafter described it as a "servitude. '"4 In an action involv-
ing the construction of locks and dams on the Cumberland and Ken-
40The Robert W. Parsons, 191 U.S. 17, 28 (1903).
41 United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U.S. 53 (1913).
42 Id. at 69.
43 Id. at 70.
4Jackson v. United States, 230 U.S. 1, 23 (1913).
45 Id. at 20. "Primitive conditions" as used herein refers to the natural, unimproved state of
the land.
4 United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316 (1917).
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tucky Rivers by the United States government in aid of navigation,
the Court found that a "natural servitude to the interests of naviga-
tion" exists in riparian lands forming the banks and bed of a stream,
but noted that such servitude was restricted to the natural conditions
of the waterway.47
The "dominant power in respect of navigation" has justified
raising the water level in a stream for the improvement of naviga-
tion, even where damage to structures located between high and low-
water mark resulted.4 8 Since the Court noted that repeated applica-
tion of the federal power over public navigable waters included the
entire stream bed below the high-water mark, it refused to recognize
any private property rights below such point.4 9
The Supreme Court recognized the "dominant servitude in favor
of the United States" in 1954, when it was called upon to determine
whether or not the Federal Water Power Act of 1920 abolished pri-
vate proprietary rights to use waters of navigable streams for power
purposes.50 A clear authorization by some congressional enactment
is required before the navigational servitude may be exercised against
private rights in the use of navigable waters which may have been
granted under state law.5 1 As a classic example of the fulfillment of
such requirement, the Court cited United States v. Chandler-Dunbar
Water Power Company,52 wherein the right of the federal govern-
ment to exercise its dominant servitude for purposes of interstate
commerce by controlling the flow of the St. Mary's River was au-
thorized pursuant to an act of Congress dated March 3, 1909.53
The determination of the rights of the United States govern-
ment with respect to the flow of navigable waters was settled in
1956. Tn an action to determine private rights in hydroelectric power
operations affecting the valuation of land at a Savannah River site,
the ri.ght of navigation argument was closed in favor of the govern-
ment.54 The Court reaffirmed its previous stand that Congress alone
was responsible for determining the requirements for improving and
47 Id. at 325-26.
4 United States v. Chicago M., St. P. & P. R. R., 312 U.S. 592 (1941).
49Id. at 596-97, citing United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316 (1917); United States v.
Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U.S. 53 (1913); Scranton v. Wheeler, 179 U.S.
141 (1900); Gibson v. United States, 166 U.S. 269 (1897); and Gilman v. Philadelphia,
70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 713 (1866). Damage to land above the high-water mark is discussed
at text accompanying notes 84-106 infra.
50 Federal Power Comm'n v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 347 U.S. 239 (1954).
s7 In the situation at hand, the River and Harbor Act of 1970, Pub. L. 91-611, § 107, 84
Star. 1818, amending 33 U.S.C. § 426 (1970), certainly appears to provide that dear
authorization.
5 2 229 U.S. 53 (1913).
s3 Federal Power Comm'n v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 347 U.S. at 249-50 (1954).
54United States v. Twin City Power Co., 350 U.S. 222 (1956).
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protecting navigation to promote commerce between the states and
with foreign countries. So long as the navigational interests are pro-
tected, the constitutional interests originating in the commerce clause
will be served, and the advancement of any other purposes along
with that of navigation is irrelevant. 55 The power granted to Con-
gress to regulate commerce, interpreted to include the regulation of
navigation, is a right which, as a "dominant servitude" or a "superior
navigation easement," is exclusive of all others both public and pri-
vate which may exist in flowing waters and which (as in this whole
series of cases) may be asserted against any rights tending to con-
flict or compete with the public's interest in unobstructed or un-
hampered navigability.5 ' Since the government may exercise an ex-
clusive right in navigable waters below the high-water mark, all other
rights granted by it to the states and by them to private citizens are
subordinate to that dominant right and subject to relinquishment as
the public's needs in the waterway may require.5 7
The government's position has been challenged in subsequent
actions, with the right of the United States to exercise its dominant
navigational servitude consistently upheld. 58 It should be recalled,
however, that that right has been qualified where the public right
conflicts with the exercise of some private right, and the courts have
required the showing of a specific congressional authorization for
the exercise of the navigational servitude when private rights are
affected.
Coast Guard Icebreaking
The "dominant navigational servitude" may conceivably be ex-
ercised by any of several agencies of the federal government. The
United States Coast Guard is governed mainly by the requirements
of Title 14, United States Code. Section 2 of Title 14 delineates a
composite picture in broad terms of all the primary duties assigned
to the Coast Guard. Included therein is the requirement that the:
Coast Guard . . . shall develop, establish, maintain, and op-
erate, with due regard to the requirements of national de-
fense .... icebreaking facilities . . . for the promotion of
safety, under and over the high seas and waters subject to
the jurisdiction of the United States . . ..
5- Id. at 224. In regard to the Great Lakes ice problem, therefore, it is irrelevant what other
interests may be served by the premature ice breakup, as long as the primary concern is
the improvement of navigation in furtherance of the national interests originating in the
commerce clause.
Md. at 224-25.
"Id. at 227-28.
"'United States v. Rands, 389 U.S. 121 (1967); Pitman v. United States, 457 F.2d 975
(Ct. Cl., 1972).
19 14 U.S.C. § 2 (1970), amending 14 U.S.C. § 2 (1949).
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Pursuant to statutory requirements, the Commandant of the
Coast Guard has promulgated instructions establishing the domestic
icebreaking policy of the Coast Guard.60 Two specific purposes are
enumerated as justification for the Coast Guard's policy and mission
in this respect, i.e., the assistance of waterborne commerce by open-
ing and keeping open shipping lanes along the principal waterways
of commerce, and the control or prevention of flooding caused by
ice jams. 61
In conjunction with the Coast Guard's role of providing assist-
ance in aid of commerce, and pursuant to the Rivers and Harbors
Act of 1970, the Coast Guard has been working in cooperation with
the Corps of Engineers of the United States Army on a:
program to demonstrate the practicability of extending the
navigation season on the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence
Seaway, including but not limited to, ship voyages extending
beyond the normal navigation season and observation and
surveillance of ice conditions and ice forces.62
The Coast Guard, without question, has statutory authority to
maintain and employ a specialized class of vessels with icebreaking
capabilities.6 To what extent they legally may be employed may be
another matter, however. It would certainly seem that Congress was
well within its constitutional bounds when it passed the 1970 Rivers
and Harbors Act. Therein lies the key to the present dispute. Federal
Power Commission v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation" re-
quired that a specific congressional authorization be given for the
exercise of the navigational servitude if private rights in the navi-
gable waterway were to be affected, citing the St. Mary's River case
of United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Company6s as
an example of such appropriate legislation." Moreover, in United
States v. Twin City Power Company,67 the Court said emphatically
60 Commandant, United States Coast Guard, Domestic Icebreaking Policy, Instruction
3253.1 (April 1, 1970) (Copy on file in Ninth Coast Guard District Legal Office, Fed.
Bldg., Cleveland, Oh.) [Hereinafter referred to as Commandant's Instruction]. Domestic
as used herein refers to the use of icebreaking facilities in the area of the continental
United States as opposed to polar icebreaking which encompasses Arctic and Antarctic
operations. As the senior officer of the major agency in the U.S. Department of Trans-
portation, the Commandant issues pertinent instructions for the implementation of
departmental policy as it relates to the conduct of Coast Guard missions.
61 Commandant's Instruction, supra note 60.
62 River and Harbor Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-611, § 107(b), 84 Stat. 1818.
63 14 U.S.C. §2 (1970). See also, KAPLAN & HUNT, supra note 32, at 131-46, particularly
143-44.
64347 U.S. 239 (1954).
65229 U.S. 53 (1913).
66 Federal Power Comm'n v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 347 U.S. 239, 249-50 (1954).
67350 U.S. 222 (1956).
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that congressional action in the interest of navigation to promote
commerce was its only concern, and that whatever else may or may
not be benefited thereby was constitutionally irrelevant.68
Thus, there is clearly a congressional mandate in the 1970
Rivers and Harbors Act, and also court approval (in cases not con-
sidering the 1970 Act) regarding the furtherance of commerce via
navigation, both seemingly authorizing the Army Corps of Engi-
neers to proceed, with the assistance of the Coast Guard, to conduct
a feasibility study for an extended navigation season.69 Since the
Coast Guard is uniquely endowed with the ability to navigate in
otherwise non-navigable waters (because of the ice), it appears that
Congress (in its exclusive right to make such a determination) has
recognized that ice, or naturally frozen navigable waters, although
ordinarily an obstruction to navigation, may not be so under certain
circumstances. 70 The Coast Guard, or anyone else for that matter,
is perfectly free to navigate through ice. The qualification is, of
course, that in order to accomplish such a feat, a vessel must be
equipped with icebreaking capabilities such as those presently found
on specially outfitted Coast Guard vessels.7 ' The limiting factor,
therefore, is not legal in nature, but rather physical.72
Until all of the lake carriers (which presumably would be en-
gaged in transporting much of the goods and bulk cargo on the Great
Lakes during any period of extension into the ice season) could be-
come specially equipped to operate self-sufficiently (as some are
capable of doing even now), any policy of domestic icebreaking
formulated within the Coast Guard must include a provision for
icebreaking resources to be employed during the extended season in
ice bound areas.73 If it is in the best interests of the nation to under-
RId. at 224.
69River and Harbor Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-611, § 107, 84 Stat. 1818.
70See Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 421 (1855);
United States v. Appalachian Electric Power Co., 311 U.S. 377 (1940).
7 The most obvious special equipment necessary for such operations are a reinforced bow,
greater shaft horsepower, heavy-duty propulsion and steering gear (propellers and rudders)
with protective shielding where possible to enable maneuvering astern if necessary, and
raw water intake heaters to prevent freezing of the engine cooling system. Some privately
owned vessels operating on the Great Lakes are even now equipped with reinforced bows
and special steering gear for navigation in ice.
7 Almost any steel-hulled vessel and even some with wooden hulls can navigate through
thin sheet ice of up to several inches thickness, but the older and thicker the ice becomes,
combined with pressure ridges caused by breaking and refreezing, the harder it is to
penetrate. An alternative to independent vessel operation in ice is to use specially equipped
icebreakers stategically placed in formation with unequipped vessels in convoy through
a frozen ice field. The icebreakers penetrate the ice allowing the standard-hulled vessels
to pass through the area with little or no damage. Such procedure is regularly employed
by the Coast Guard when rendering assistance to vessels which become icebound. For
general information regarding Great Lakes icebreaking operations, procedures, and equip-
ment, refer to JOINT GUIDE, supra note 1, at 8-14. See also Sherer, Icebreaking on the
Great Lakes, COAST GUARD ENGINEER'S DIGEST 38 (March, 1974).
7 Year-Around Shipping Season on the Great Lakes, supra note 10.
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take such a project on a full-time basis, it will be incumbent upon
all agencies involved to perform their specialized tasks in further-
ance of the national interests. At the same time, whatever existing
private rights which might be adversely affected or lost by such a
project must somehow be protected or compensated.
Liability
While there can be no doubt that the island residents have cer-
tain rights to use natural ice bridges for travel and transportation,
nevertheless, those private rights are subordinate to the public right
of navigation, particularly when exercised through the congressional
power to regulate commerce through navigation. Thus the issue:
where two rights (that of the public to control navigation through
its government, and that of private citizens to use and enjoy the
waters in their natural condition) compete, and the public right
prevails, should there be compensation for the loss of the private
rights?
The narrow issue is whether a governmental agency (or any
other party so engaged), acting under congressional authorization,
should be liable for the consequences of its icebreaking activities in
conjunction with that authorization. For example, if unreliable ferry
service results, should the agency be liable for costs involved in pro-
viding alternative means of transportation? Further, should liability
attach for any other losses suffered by the private citizens of the
region, such as lost wages and education, unavailability of medical
treatment, or damage to property?
There are four interests of immediate importance to consider
when answering these questions. One, of course, is that of the fed-
eral government which must rely on the exercise of the navigational
servitude with explicit authority from Congress as justification for
its superior right of navigation in aid of commerce. Another is the
general commercial interest which will benefit by the extended ship-
ping season, acting in conjunction with, or independent of, govern-
mental efforts. On the other hand, there are two groups of island
residents who have established certain property rights, the taking
of which may or mav not be compensable under the fifth amendment
to the Constitution.74 One groun consists of owners of riparian lands
who may contend that the breaking of ice during the extended season
will result in the erosion of their beaches or damage to other prop-
ertv (boats, docks. boathouses). That group will be dealt with
briefly, but the primary interest here is with the other, the persons
74 U.S. CONST. amend. V, as applicable here reads, "... nor shall private property be taken
for public use without just compensation."
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who could conceivably become stranded on their islands as a result
of their loss of the traditional use of the ice in its natural state,
either for walking across or as a natural bridge (boom) to assist in
maintaining an open-water ferry track. The loss of that traditional
reliance may amount to a taking of private property for public use
which should be compensable under the fifth amendment.7 5
Riparian Owners
With respect to the position of the riparian land owners who
might seek to recover for ice-caused damages resulting from the
passage of vessels past their property, two types of damage may re-
sult. First, as to the damage of any structure or object located in
the bed of the waterway below the high-water mark no matter how
permanently situated, the weight of authority most definitely appears
7SAt this point, the general practitioner may feel that his talents lie elsewhere. Such
attitude need not be the case, however, since the merger of the Admiralty Rules and the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for United States District Courts. FED. R. Civ. P. 1,
9(h). No longer is there an "admiralty side" of the Federal District Court, and problems
involving admiralty jurisdiction need be no more novel to the uninitiated attorney than
any other previously unexplored area of the law. Suffice it to say here that since 1845 the
admiralty jurisdiction of the Federal District Courts has included the Great takes and
the navigable waters connecting them. Act of Feb. 26, 1845, ch. 20, 5 Stat. 726. See
Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443 (1851), holding that Act of Congress
to be consistent with the Constitution of the United States. See also Interlake Steamship
Co. v. Nielsen, 338 F.2d 879 (6th Cir. 1964), holding that frozen navigable waters
adjacent to a dock on the Great takes are dearly subject to admiralty jurisdiction.
The 1920 Suits in Admiralty Act vested exclusive jurisdiction in the district courts
for actions against the United States arising out of the operation of merchant vessels or
tugs for the federal government. Suits in Admiralty by or against Vessels or Cargoes
of the United States, 46 U.S.C. §§ 741 et seq. (1920); see Matson Navigation Co. v.
United States, 284 U.S. 352 (1932), vesting exclusive jurisdiction of all maritime
causes of action against the United States arising out of the Suits in Admiralty Act in
the district courts. See also Andrews & Co. v. United States, 124 F.Supp. 362 (Ct. Cl.
1954), interpreting the Act to include all merchant vessels owned by the United States
or operated by or for it. Liability was expanded by the 1925 Public Vessels Act to
include damages caused by public vessels belonging to the United States. Public Vessels
Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 781-91 (1925). In 1960, the Suits in Admiralty Act jurisdiction of
bring all maritime claims against United States vessels into the admiralty jurisdiction of
the district courts. Bushey v. United States, 398 F.2d 167 (2d Cir. 1968).
Although the Federal Tort Claims Act has been applied to maritime torts of the
United States, more recent cases hold that maritime tort claims should be brought under
the Suits in Admiralty Act, not the Federal Tort Claims Act. Federal Tort Claims Act,
28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-80, (1948); Moran v. United States, 102 F.Supp. 275 (D. Conn.
1951). See also Tankrederiet Gefion A/S v. United States, 241 F.Supp. 83 (S.D. Mich.
1964). In fact, the United States has been held to have the same duty under sections
1346(b) and 2671 of the Federal Tort Claims Act as under the Suits in Admiralty Act.
Beeler v. United States, 256 F.Supp. 771 (W.D. Pa. 1966).
In 1948 Congress passed the Admiralty and Maritime Jurisdiction Act to extend
admiralty jurisdiction to any property damage or personal injury caused by any vessel
on navigable waters regardless of the fact that the damage or injury may have occurred
or been consummated on land. Admiralty and Maritime Jurisdiction Act, 46 U.S.C.
§ 740 (1948). The Act specifically provided, however, that the Suits in Admiralty or
Public Vessels Acts shall constitute the exclusive remedy for actions brought against
the United States. More importantly, the Act also provided that no suit against the United
States may be filed until six months have elapsed after a written complaint and claim has
been presented to the federal agency owning or operating the vessel which allegedly
caused the injury or damage.
19741
15Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1974
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
against recovery.7 6 The exercise of the dominant navigational servi-
tude includes everything below the high-water mark.77 The fact that
the riparian owner is geographically situated to build and use such
structures exclusive of other nonriparian owners does not protect
his legal position with respect to the federal government. Since the
exercise of the navigational easement must be congressionally au-
thorized,7 8 compensation for damages resulting therefrom, if justi-
fied on the grounds of a fifth amendment "taking" for public use,
would merely mean that the United States is paying for something
it already owns, something already within the inventory of the pub-
lic domain 7 9 Cases denying liability in analogous situations have dis-
cussed "incidental consequences in exercise of the right,"80 "con-
sequential damages as a matter of law,"8 1 and "an obligation of a
riparian owner to suffer the consequences of an improvement of
navigation by the United States in exercise of its dominant right in
that regard. ' 82 This apparently settled doctrine of governmental im-
munity from consequential damages has been applied (in at least
one case involving the Tennessee Valley Authority), regardless of
"whether the alleged liability is predicated on nuisance, negligence,
or other tortious conduct."83
Moreover. since the dominant servitude is restricted to the
navigable limits of the waterway as determined by the high-water
mark,84 "it is consistent . . . to deny compensation where the claim-
ant's private title is burdened with this servitude but to award com-
76United States v. Chicago M., St. P. & P. R. R., 312 U.S. 592, 596-97 (1941), citing
United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316 (1917); United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water
Power Co., 229 U.S. 53 (1913); Scranton v. Wheeler, 179 U.S. 141 (1900); Gibson
v. United States, 166 U.S. 269 (1897); and Gilman v. Philadelphia, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.)
713 (1866).
77United States v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co., 339 U.S. 799, 808 (1950).
78Federal Power Comm'n v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 347 U.S. 239, 249-50 (1954)
(action to determine whether Federal Water Power Act of 1920 abolished private
proprietary rights to use waters of navigable stream for power purposes).
"United States v. Twin City Power Co., 350 U.S. 222, 228 (1956) (action for condemna-
tion by the United States to determine whether valuation includes value of land as site
for hydroelectric power operations on the Savannah River).
8°South Pacific Co. v. United States, 58 Ct. Cl. 428, 432 (1923), aff'd, 266 U.S. 586
(1924).
81 Franklin v. United States, 101 F.2d 459, 463 (6th Cir.), afl'd, 308 U.S. 516 (1939).
82W. A. Ross Constr. Co. v. Yearsley, 103 F.2d 589, 592 (8th Cir. 1939), aff'd, 309 U.S.
18 (1940).
'3Atchley v. T.V.A., 69 F.Supp. 952, 954 (N.D. Ala. 1947) (action to recover for lost
crops as a result of negligent, wanton, or willful flooding of a T.V.A. reservoir).
8 The "high-water mark" is properly applicable to tidal waters, and designates the line
on the shore reached by the water at the high or flood tide. The high-water mark of a
river, not subject to tide, is the line which the river impresses on the soil by covering
it for sufficient periods to deprive it of vegetation, and to destroy its value for agricul-
ture. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1763 (4th ed. Rev. 1968). Since the Great Lakes are
only minimally affected by tides, this distinction is more academic than practical.
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pensation where his title is not so burdened. '85 Thus, as to the lands
above the normal high-water mark, there appears to be a divergence
of opinion on the obligation to provide compensation for damage
to them.
The dividing line between those cases imposing liability and
those which do not centers upon the degree of harm and permanence
of the damage. 86 Those favoring compensation follow the principle
that when the natural conditions of the waterway are drastically
altered causing some permanent destruction to the land, the owners
would then be entitled to compensation as a fifth amendment "taking"
for public purposes.87 There is some case authority to support a
finding that such alterations may include, but are not limited to, the
raising of the water above the ordinary high-water mark by con-
struction of locks and dams and other flood control projects.88
Further, in order for the "taking" to be constitutionally compens-
able it need not be a complete taking of a person's property but,
rather, may only involve "a direct interference with or disturbance
of property rights. ' 89
On the other hand, cases denying compensation with respect to
shore erosion indicate that where there has been no direct or con-
tinuous taking of property in the sense that the land is physically
entered and taken over for public use, but only incidental or con-
sequential losses are suffered, such damage is not compensable under
the fifth amendment unless specifically authorized by statute.9 0 Under
the fifth amendment, the federal government is obliged to compen-
sate only for that which it takes by direct appropriation; it is not
obliged to do more. "It need only pay for what it takes rather than
for all that the owner has lost."91
A recent case of shore erosion, relying on the fifth amendment
right of compensation, involved the Canaveral Harbor Project in
Florida.92 In that case, since Congress authorized a project designed
to provide a deepwater harbor in aid of navigation, plaintiff's right
8 United States v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co., 339 U.S. 799, 808 (1950).
86 See 2 P. NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN § 5.79 (3d ed. 1970).
87 Coates v. United States, 93 F.Supp. 637 (Ct. Cl. 1950).
8 Tennessee Gas Transm'n Co. v. United States, 173 Ct. Cl. 1180, 1181 (1965), cert. denied,
383 U.S. 943 (1966).
09R. J. Widen Co. v. United States, 357 F.2d 988, 993 (1966). See also United States v.
Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725 (1950) (an interference with natural seasonal
overflow of the San Joaquin River onto riparian grasslands held compensable).
9 0 Franklin v. United States, 101 F.2d 459, 463 (6th Cir.), aff'd, 308 U.S. 516 (1939).
91 R. J. Widen Co. v. United States, 357 F.2d 988, 994 (Ct. Cl. 1966), citing Monogahela
Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312 (1893). See also United States v. Virginia
Electric & Power Co., 365 U.S. 624, 633 (1961).
92 Pitman v. United States, 457 F.2d 975 (Ct. Cl. 1972).
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to recover required a showing of "a property right in the uninter-
rupted and natural flow of the Atlantic Ocean." 93 If that require-
ment is compared by way of analogy to a showing of a property
right in the uninterrupted and natural state of frozen waterways,
such as in the present discussion, some interesting conclusions might
be drawn.
In the Canaveral Harbor Project situation, the court found that
the plaintiff was unable to show a permanent inundation of his land
above the high-water mark by an increase in the level of the Atlantic
Ocean. It could not be proven, the court said, that the action of the
government directly caused the reaction from which plaintiff sought
relief. No entry had been made onto his land by project employees
which could be considered a direct invasion or appropriation rather
than consequential damages, for which compensation would not be
granted. Even if the erosion had been reasonably foreseeable, such
contention had been rejected in previous cases by the courts.94
Finally, even if lands above the high-water mark ("fast lands")
were eroded, which was neither proven by plaintiff nor admitted by
the government, United States v. Twin City Power Company95 al-
ready held that such loss is non-compensable, and plaintiff was not
entitled to recover.96
If those considerations are applied to the problem under discus-
sion, the result should be the same. In the present situation there
has been no permanent inundation of the land, but, if anything, only
a relatively slight and occasional displacement of the ice along the
water's edge. There certainly has been no direct entry upon the land
by any personnel involved with the extended season project except
with express permission of the land owner in order to obtain ice,
weather, and other scientific data.97 No allegation of reasonable fore-
seeability has been offered, nor would such contention necessarily
sustain a right to compensation. 98 Finally, the Twin City case, coupled
9Id. at 976.
94W. A. Ross Constr. Co. v. Yearsley, 103 F.2d 589 (8th Cir. 1939), afl'd, 309 U.S. 18
(1940); Franklin v. United States, 101 F.2d 459 (6th Cir.), a/I'd, 308 U.S. 516 (1939).
95 350 U.S. 222 (1956).
96Pitman v. United States, 457 F.2d 975, 977-78 (Ct. Cl. 1972).
"Some of the activities being conducted include: ground surveillance of ice conditions, ice
movements, and effects on water levels and shore properties; time lapse photography in
the St. Mary's, St. Clair, and Niagara Rivers to document ice movements and ship passages;
short term ice development forecast techniques continuing for the Great Lakes; study of
the effects of vessel passages on selected shore structures and shorelines by use of
monitors; measurement of water flow, velocity, direction, levels, and temperatures, as
well as ice thickness; field studies to determine results of ice forces on shore structures;
and assessments by the Environmental Protection Agency and others of adverse or
beneficial environmental impacts observed from monitoring programs. A Waterway For
All Seasons, COAST GuARD ENGINEER'S DIGEST 21, 24-25 (March, 1974).
"See Authorities cited supra note 91.
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with its strong application in 1972 by the Court of Claims in the
Pitman case, seems to preclude, at least for the present time, any
right of recovery for incidental or consequential erosion of uplands
where no direct or permanent invasion of the owner's fast lands
accompanies the damage." Since the United States Court of Claims
failed to find a private property right in the uninterrupted and
natural flow of the Atlantic Ocean,10 0 it follows that no similar right
exists in the uninterrupted and natural state of the frozen water-
ways of the Great Lakes.
In one of the rare suits filed for damages caused by the maneu-
vering of a vessel in an ice field, the "average reasonable man"
standard of due care as exercised by the "prudent seaman" was used
to determine liability. 101 Reasonable care must be employed when
operating a vessel so as not to willfully inflict damage to shore struc-
tures, although some degree of risk must be assumed by the owners
of such installations due to their location in or near navigable
waters. 02 "Negligence at sea," the court reasoned, "does not differ,
in principle, from negligence ashore."' 0 3 Statutory fault was imposed
because a lookout was not properly posted as required by the Rules
of the Nautical Road.' 4 Applying the standard of the prudent sea-
man operating his vessel with reasonable care in compliance with
applicable statutory requirements for navigation on the Great Lakes,
it appears likely that an action filed to recover damages as a result
of such navigation through an ice field, absent a showing of negli-
gence, would meet with little success. 05 As long as reasonable pre-
cautions are taken in ice breaking operations to avoid inflicting
what might be considered "willful" or "negligent" damage to shore
installations, it appears that liability would not be imposed for in-
cidental or consequential damages resulting from such operations.
0 6
99Pitman v. United States, 457 F.2d 975 (Ct. CI. 1972).
100 Id.
101 R. & H. Development Co. v. Diesel Tanker, J. A. Martin, Inc., 203 A.2d 766, 771 (2d
Conn. Cir. Ct. 1964); see G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, JR., THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 420
(1957).
702 R. &. H. Development Co. v. Diesel Tanker, J. A. Martin, Inc., 203 A.2d 766, 770-71
(2d Conn. Cir. Ct. 1964).
03 Id. at 771.
704 ... The Rules are not a complete and comprehensive code of navigation, compliance
with which is sufficient to avoid liability, but that, on the contrary, the ordinary precau-
tions of good seamanship, as defined by custom and case law, are still required. 'Negligence'
in general, as well as non-compliance with the Rules, is a ground of liability." G. GILMORE
& C. BLACK, JR., supra note 97, at 420 (1957). Compare this rule with the "Pennsylvania
Rule," The Pennsylvania, 86 U.S. 125 (1873).
10SAnd see Atchley v. T.V.A., 69 F.Supp. 952 (N.D. Ala. 1947), in support of the argu-
ment that even negligence may not result in liability under some circumstances.
106 R. & H. Development Co. v. Diesel Tanker, J. A. Martin, Inc., 203 A.2d 766, 770 (2d
Conn. Cir. Ct. 1964), citing People's Ice Co. v. The Excelsior, 44 Mich. 229, 234, 6 N.W.
636, 639 (1880).
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Loss of Transit
But what of the private property rights of the greater number
of islanders, the non-riparian owners? Have not interests of a totally
different nature from those of the riparian owners been affected by
an extended navigation season? Could those citizens not assert a
property right in the continued use of traditional ice bridges? Is the
use and enjoyment of the natural condition of an area which has
provided a traditional ice bridge for travel over the water to the
mainland, or has served as a natural ice boom to prevent obstruction
of the open-water ferry track, a right which may be classified as a
private property right for which compensation must be made if taken
for public use such as the improvement of navigation? An 1893 case,
Monongahela Navigation Company v. United States,10 7 provides a
starting point by relating the "improvement of navigation" provi-
sions of the congressional power to regulate commerce to the com-
pensation requirement for the taking of private property under the
fifth amendment. Although Congress has ultimate control and reg-
ulation of navigation and commerce, if private property is taken in
exercise of that control, then just compensation must be paid.10 8
Since the taking of private property must be compensated, it is nec-
essary to determine what rights, if any, in the use or enjoyment of
the navigable waterway, whether flowing or frozen, fall within the
scope of compensable private property.
In Gibson v. United States'0 9 and Scranton v. Wheeler, 10 decided
near the turn of the century, the Supreme Court held that a riparian
owner's access to public navigable waters may be impaired or even
destroyed by improvements of navigation authorized by Congress.
Loss of access was merely a consequence which must be borne by the
owner of riparian lands in order that navigation might be im-
proved."' Requiring compensation for such incidental results would
tend to have a crippling effect on Congress' attempts to improve
navigation in promotion of commerce." 2 The right of access was held
not a compensable private property right under the fifth amendment
requirement. 113 The same result would seemingly apply to the rights
of non-riparian owners with respect to access to public navigable
waters.
17 148 U.S. 312 (1893).
11 Id. at 336.
109 166 U.S. 269 (1897).
110 179 U.S. 141 (1900).
M Gibson v. United States, 166 U.S. 269, 276 (1897); see 2 NICHOLS, supra note 83,
§5.792.
112 Scranton v. Wheeler, 179 U.S. 141, 164-65 (1900).
113 Id. at 165.
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A 1964 Ohio case arrived at a similar result dealing with the
question of the rights of a riparian owner with access to the navi-
gable part of a stream which had been cut off by the authorized con-
struction of a bridge across the stream.1 4 Ownership of land on a
public navigable stream, although giving the owner more of an op-
portunity to enjoy an access to the water, nevertheless does not give
him any greater right to its use for navigation than any other mem-
ber of the public has. He, therefore, has no constitutional right to
compensation for loss of access to navigable waters. 15
The right to insist on the retention of the status quo was re-
jected by the Supreme Court in 1913 when it stated that "an indi-
vidual owner has no right to insist that primitive conditions be suf-
fered to remain and thus all progress and development be rendered
impossible."'1 16 The Court reaffirmed its view that the United States
would not be liable for remote or consequential damages resulting
from appropriate attempts undertaken to benefit navigation. 117
Between 1913 and 1956 the Supreme Court considered a series
of four extremely important cases culminating in United States v.
Twin City Power Company' 8 regarding the question of the existence
of private property rights in the hydroelectric power capacity of
public navigable waters." 9 In those cases, the Court developed the
theme that since the public right of navigation exercised by the fed-
eral government's dominant servitude is paramount, compensation
for any private rights claimed in the flow of navigable waters over
which the government already had dominion would result in the gov-
ernment paying for something it already owned.120 The right to ap-
propriate the current for commercial use belongs not to a riparian
owner, except with respect to other riparian owners, but rather in
the Congress.'2 ' Private claims in the public domain would be created
if the United States was required to pay for the hydroelectric power
value of a navigable waterway lost as a result of improvements in
aid of navigation.'22 The effect on the rights of an individual or
114 State ex rel. Andersons v. Masheter, 1 Ohio St. 2d 11, 203 N.E.2d 325 (1964).
l15 Id.
116 Jackson v. United States, 230 U.S. 1, 20 (1913); and see definition, supra note 45.
117 Jackson v. United States, 230 U.S. 1, 23 (1913), citing United States v. Chandler-
Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U.S. 53 (1913).
"
6 350 U.S. 222 (1956).
119 Federal Power Comm'n v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 347 U.S. 239 (1954); United
States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499 (1945); and United States v. Chandler-
Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U.S. 53 (1913).
1
20 Id.
121 United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U.S. 53, 76 (1913).
12eUnited States v. Twin City Power Co., 350 U.S. 222, 228 (1956).
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group made by the exercise of the dominant navigational servitude
was succinctly described in United States v. Willow River Power
Company :123
Rights, property or otherwise, which are absolute against
all the world are certainly rare, and water rights are not
among them. Whatever rights may be as between equals such
as riparian owners, they are not the measure of riparian
rights on a navigable stream relative to the function of the
Government in improving navigation. Where these interests
conflict they are not to be reconciled as between equals, but
the private interest must give way to superior right, or
perhaps it would be more accurate to say that as against
the Government such private interest is not a right at all.)24
A more recent subject of judicial treatment with respect to a
taking of private rights in the use of a waterway has been the con-
sideration of the right to be compensated for the value of land based
on its potential use as a port site.1 25 No distinction could be made, how-
ever, between value as a power site or as a port site, and since the
Supreme Court had already held that there was no constitutional duty
to compensate in the power cases, no obligation could be found to
compensate for lost port value.
1 26
United States v. 8,968.06 Acres of Land127 treated the problem
of determining the right to compensation for various land uses by
asking whether that use is "one which the United States, in the exer-
cise of its dominant navigational servitude, has the power to pro-
hibit or destroy without incurring the constitutional duty to com-
pensate."1 28 Applying that guideline to the situation on the Great
Lakes gives rise to the question toward which this paper is directed:
whether the United States government, in the exercise of its authority
to promote commerce by extending the normal navigation season,
has the power or right to destroy or substantially impair, without
liability for compensation in any form, the right of the islanders and
others similarly situated not to be stranded during the winter months
of the extended navigation season.
1- 324 U.S. 499 (1945).
124Id. at 510.
125United States v. Rands, 389 U.S. 121 (1967); United States v. 8,968.06 Acres of Land,
318 F.Supp. 698 (S.D. Tex. 1970).
26United States v. Rands, 389 U.S. 121, 124-25 (1967).
17318 F.Supp. 698 (S.D. Tex. 1970).
12 Id. at 703.
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Conclusion
As harsh as it may sound, the federal government may, with
judicial impunity, exercise its dominant navigational servitude to
improve navigation on the Great Lakes by breaking the ice formed
in the restricted connecting waters between the Lakes, and conse-
quently may thereby strand the island inhabitants who have tradi-
tionally relied on the unbroken ice for travel or transportation.
If damages from any other cause than a taking of private
property for public use are to be absorbed by the public,
they must be assumed by act of Congress and may not be
awarded by the courts merely by implication from the Con-
stitutional provisions. 129
Congress has authorized the Coast Guard to break ice. It has
directed that a study be made of extended navigation into the winter
months on the Great Lakes, utilizing Coast Guard icebreaking as-
sistance. Ice has been broken, people have been stranded (conceiv-
ably for long periods of time), and the judiciary has determined in
prior cases involving analogous facts that a property right may not
be asserted against the federal government in the private reliance
on the natural condition of a public navigable waterway. The remedy
for the loss of such right may be found only in the Congress, accord-
ing to the courts, absent a direct and permanent "taking" of the
riparian fast lands for public use.
As early as May 13, 1971, one such congressional appeal was
made. The proposition was put forth by one Great Lakes Congress-
man: ". . if the public expenditure for year-round shipping is
justifiable, then so also is the expenditure to provide safe, adequate,
year-round transportation to these inhabited islands." 130
The solution is relatively simple. Transportation or travel be-
tween two points can only be accomplished by land, sea, or air. Many
reasonable, realistic, and economically feasible alternatives have been
proposed elsewhere to solve this transportation problem. 131 The fed-
129 United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499, 502 (1945).
130 Year-Around Shipping Season on the Great Lakes, supra note 10, at 14946.
131 As suggested before, alternative means of crossing the various waters when premature
breakup is experienced have been considered. Included in the list have been a permanent
bridge; a seasonal pontoon-type bridge; use of helicopter "ferry" service; use of air cushion
vehicles which can traverse land, ice, or water; air-bubbler systems to reduce ice jamming
at ferry landings; government modification of privately owned ferry vessels to enable them
to operate in ice; and even use of government vessels to transport private citizens when
necessary. A Waterway For All Seasons, supra note 97, at 26.
The Lake Shipping Division of the United States Steel Corporation, a commercial
beneficiary of the extended navigation season, has:
... proposed to the Army Corps of Engineers that an ice structure be established
above the Little Rapids Cut in the St. Mary's River as a test installation to
determine if ice structures won't be the answer to allowing co-habitation of
commercial traffic and the proper safe transit of the islanders.
Letter from W. R. Ransom to R. T. Keenen, supra note 4.
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eral government, although not legally obliged to do so, must certainly
consider the human factors involved. If Congress can authorize the
expenditure of federal resources to promote private commercial ship-
ping interests, certainly there would seem to be ample justification
for a like expenditure, legally required or not, to promote public
transportation interests.
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